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Thi~ psper pre~ent~ ~truetural modeL of ~equmtial job ~earch in which iadi-
viduaL take into aceount their supply of labour in the job scceptance decieioa.
Two aprosches sre followed. Fint the aeo-claucal as~umption u made that, givm
the wage rate, iadividuaL can choo~e their working hours optimally by ma:imis-
ing utility subjeet to the bndget constraint. Uader thie condition, the aroumption
from ~tandatd job ~eatch thcory that the wage rate i~ the only job characteriatic
on whieh the job aeeeptance deci~ioa i~ ba~ed ean be jwtified. Dats on lsbour
aupply can be used as additional informstion ia the atimation of the parameten
of the utility fuaction. The ~econd approach i~ to as~ume thst weekly working
hour~ i~ s job characteri~tic which, jwt like the wage rate, srrivea from an offer
distribution. Both modeL are u~ed to construet a ~tstionary ~tructural model of
uaemploymmt durstion which ineludes uaob~erved heterogmeity. The level of the
wcial ~ecurity bmeftt paymmts will inSumce the job seeeptanee deciuoa and the
wcial recurity ey~tem as a whole is modelled u a state depmdmt source ofincome.
The models csn be estimated with the msrimum Iikelihood ertimstor, bnt this will
require a ~ubstantial amount of C.P.U. time, due to the faet that the uaob~erved
heterogmeity haa to be integrated ont. Therefore, vadow ~imulation estimstor~
ate di~cuseed.
rThe anthor thanh Arie Kapteya, Vsuilis Hqjirasrilion, Tony Laneaeter aad Arthnr van Soest for
their helpfnl comments. All the remsining etron are dne to the anthor. The Central Bnrean ofStatutica
u thanked for kindly providing the data.1
1 Introduction
Thie psper presents models in which elements of job seatch theory and the labour
supply literature are combined. A functional form for the models will be epecified aad
the functional form will be estimated strncturally. Flinn and Heckman (1982s) preaent
an overview of the eetimation of structural job search modeL. Applicatioae can be found
ia Narendransthan snd Nickell (1985) aad Van dea Berg (1990a). In order to find closed
form solutions for the model restrictive assumptions have to be made and this ie the
ressoa why the cstimation of etructural job search modele has not become as popular as
the reduced form durstion modele, see Flina and Heckman (1982b) and Kiefer (1988)
for an overview.
Nevertheless, there is etill room for eztension in the specification of structural job
eearch models as compared with the models which have been estimated up till now.
Notably the assumption .thst the wage rste is the only component in the objective
function of the iadividual decision maker can be relaxed. The standard job search
framework is only concerned with the choice of a job on the basis of the wsge rate.
On the other hand, there eriste an extensive literatnre on labour supply models. In
these modele the availsbility of s job is given and the emphssis is on the participation
decision and the choice of the number of hours. Until now few attempts have been made
to integrate these two types of models. The aim of the present psper is to eztend the
etandard job search frsmework with elements of labour supply theory.
Basically two routes can be followed. The firet one ie to make the neo-classical as-
sumption thst individuals can choose their lsbour supply optimally given the level of
their wage rste. In this case the assumption fmm standard job search theory that the
wage rate is the only job component on which the job scceptance decision is bssed re-
mains valid. The neo-classical aaeumptioa ie nsually aot supported by empirical evidence
on the distribution of hours worked, where we typically sce peaks at various levels of
hours, e.g. at 40 hours a wcek. Therefore, the second possibility is to assume that hours
are, just like the wage rste, a componeat of the job offer. The firet attempt to introduce
houra in a job search context was made by Kider (1984). In the labour supply litera-
ture restrictions oa hours were introduced in a static model by Dickens and Lnndberg
(1985). Their model wss iurther developed by Tummers and Woittiez (1991) and Van
Soest, Woittiea and Kspteyn (1990). A different route to handle hours reetrictione was
followed by Rettore (1990). Bloemen (1991) formulated s etatic model with hours re-
etrictioas which caa be intetpreted as a etatic versioa of a dynamic job search model in
which the rste of time prdereace is infinite.
In this psper, epeeific sttention is paid to the stochaetic specification. A random
prdereace term ie included in the utility function. As s result, the reservatioa wage
rate will be random as well, as opposed to earlier work, e.g. Van den Berg (1990a) and
Nsrendrsnsthan and Nickell (1985), in which the reservstioa wage rate could only be
changed by a chsage ia the model parameters. Both the model with aeo-classical labour
supply and the model with hours restrictions will be coneidered in this paper. Dsts on
unemployment durstion and post unemployment job chsracteristics are used to estimate
the parameters of the utility function, the parsmeters of the job offer distribution and
the job offer arrival rate. The likelihood fnnction csa be formulated, conditional on the2
random preferences, after which the random preferences can be integrated out. Thie inte-
gration procedure can be costly if it has to be performed numerically, which is definitely
the caae here, becauee the integrand coatains the reservation wage rate which is the so-
lution of a fixed point problem. To save computing time we can make use of aimulation
estimators. McFsdden (1989) introduced a simulatioa estimator which is consistent for
a fixed number of simulation replications in the context of s multinomial choice model.
Bloemen and Kapteyn (1992) adapt it to the limited dependeat vsriables model and
apply it to the neo-classical labour supply model. In their spplication they also use
simulation methods to integrate out an unobserved raadom preference variable. Various
simulation estimators in the context of models with unobserved random variables and
the specific problems which actually arise in this context will be discussed.
In sectioa 2 the model without houn restrictioae will be set up. First, attention will be
paid to the aasumptions that have to be made in order to be able to estimate the model.
After that the reservation wage equation will be detived which epecifies the etrategy
followed by the individuaL The likelihood function is specified after which it is indicated
how the likelihood estimator can be replaced by s simulation estimator. Thirdly, specific
functional forms for the model will be chosen. Fourth, the available dataset is discussed.
Finally, the model will be estimated and estimation results will be presented. In section 3
the neo-classical assumption of no hours restrictions is dropped and ajobofferis supposed
to consist of two characteristics, i.e. the number of hours and the wage rate. Instead of
a single reservation wage rate there now exists a unique reservation utility level. All job
offers which yield a higher utility value than this reservation utility value are acceptable.
Again, the model will be estimated and eetimation reeults will be presented. Section 4
presents residual analysis and the final section concludes.
2 Job search without hours restrictions
2.1 The model
In this section a job search model is presented in which an unemployed individual
maximiaes the discounted sum of cxpected future utility flows, under the assumption
that he knows the search process according to which job offers arrive. The utility flow
is a function of income and labour supply and it is aesumed that once the wage rate is
known, hours can be chosen optimally by maximisiag the utility function subject to the
budget constraint. Implicitly, the assumption of no hours restrictions is also made in the
standard job search model in which the individual just maximizes the discounted sum of
expected future utility flows. Therefore, the value of work function in the etandard job
search framework can be interpreted as the discounted sum ofindirect utility flows. In the
nezt section the neo-classical assumptioas tha4 individuels can choose hours optimally
will be dropped. Because the neo-classical assumption elucidates the relation between
the present model and the standard job sesrch framework and uncovers some of its
implicit assumptions it is a good point of departure.
In order to be able to find closed form solutions for the model, some possibly restric-
tive assumptions have to be made. Most of these assumptions are standard assump-
tions which are nsually made ia structural models of job search. They can be found3
in Morteneen (1986). We deviste from the etandard framework in Morteneen (1986)
bq including labour supply in the utility function. A different spprosch of iacorporat-
ing labour eupply in the context of s job eeuch model caa be iound in Burdett and
Mortensen (1978).
The assumptions are the follawing:
1. The individual maumiaee s diecounted eum offuture expected utility flowe, eubject
to the budget constraint and the job offer procese:
m~ E f~n(v.,k.cE)e-.c~-~lde (2.i)
where yi ie income in period t, hi ie labour supply in peziod t, p ie the discount
rste, e ie aa iadividual epecific, time indepeadeat unobeerved random tute pa-
rameter, known to the individuaL The appearance of the e~ectatioa eiga reíere
to the uncertainty about the future etate, i.e. the uncertain job posaibilities and
the seeociated wsge ratea. The job offer srrival and wage processes are epecified
below. By the inclneion of labour eupply in the utility function we deviate from
the etandard job eearch frsmework, in which the utility function containe income
only.
2. The income consiats of s etate dependent component and a etate independent
component (aon-labour income). If employed, income equals the eum of labour
income and aon-labour income:
ye - wlk f It (2.2)
where w is the wage rate and p ie non-labour income. If unemployed, income
equale the aum of the unemployment benefit payments b aad the etste independent
income: " ~
ye-6-~p (2.3)
As a coneequence, the level ofthe benefit paymente will influence thejob acceptance
decision.
3. A job offer consiste of a wage rate w. Job offere amve randomly according to
a Poiseon proceae with parameter J1 from a distribution functioa F(.;~,r) with
sccompanying deneity function f(.;~, r),with ~i the location parameter snd r the
scale parameter. The dietributioa fuaction ie known to the individual. The domsin
of F(.; ~, r) ie (0, ao).
4. The model ie etstionary, i.e. the job offer urival rate a, the uaemployment beaefit
leveló, the wage distribution F(w; rj,, r) and the noa-labour income p sre indepen-
dent of both calendsr time and elapeed durstion.
5. Once the unemployed hae accepted s job it will be kept until forever.4
6. The ntility function has the properties:
~ ~ 0 (2.4)
k(h) :- u(wh .} p,h; e) (2.5)
k~(h) G 0 for all h~ 0 (2.6)
Under theae asaumptiona it can be derived that there exista s nnique reservation wage
~(e). All wage offere above the reaervation wsge rate are acceptsble, whereae thoae below
will be rejected.
Asaumption 3 is a etandard assumption in thejob search framework. Assumption 4 is
an assumption which we need to amve st a cloeed form solution. Without thia saeump-
tion the reservation wage rate caa only be defined implicitly in term of s differential
equation, which can only be solved if not too complicated aasumptions for the proceas
of exogenous variablea are specified. Van den Berg (1990b) relaxes the stationarity as-
enmptioaa by introducing general forms of non-stationarity. Hia empirical application,
however, remaina reatricted to noa-etationarity in the benefit level b, ia which, after the
unemployment epell has reached a epecified length, a discrete jump takea plsce where-
after it remains constant. In the duration model literatnre, in which reduced form modele
are estimsted, it turas out to be difHcult to diatinguiah empirically between aegative du-
ration dependence and unobserved heterogeaeity, i.e. once unobaerved heterogeneity is
introduced, the preaence or sbsence of duration dependence is hard to eatabliah. As we
have included a rsndom pereference pusmeter in the utility functioa we hope to be able
to catch the heterogeneity in the model.
Assumption 5 ia made to be able to find s closed form expression for the valne of
a job, which then can be compared with the value of aearch. Thie assumption is of
courae reatrictive if s job ia taken on for a ahort period oaly, but if a fixed job is taken
on it is not unreaeonable to aseume that the individuala acts ~ he will hold the job
forever. Moreover, the general form of the reservation wage equation remains valid if it
ia assumed that there is a constant layoff rate (aee e.g. Flinn aad Heckman (1982a)). In
that case we have to be careful in the interpretation of the rate of time preference p.
The final sesumptioa on the form of the utility function ie made to ensure that a higher
wage level ia alwsys preferred to a lower, and to eaeure that, once a wage level ia chosen,
within period utility will reach a marimum if it is ma~mized with respect to labour
aupply, aubject to the linear budget constraint. Note thst no reetrictions sre plsced on
the aign of the derivstive of the utility function with reapect to labour supply. Thie is
done becanse resulta of Narendranathan and Nickell (1985) and Van den Berg (1990c)
indicate that individuals might value unemployment, i.e. total leiaure, lower than having
s job. However, their specification of the objective function wsa very atraightfozward ia
the aenae that there ie a diecrete jump between the utility valuea of unemployment snd
having a job. The aize of thie jump was estimated by them with the reault mentioned
before. The reatrictiveness of their specificatioa aad the fact that their estimated utility
parsmetera were not baaed on the after spell income data directly, because the parameters
of the wage equation were estimated separstely using aome ad hoc truncation rule, imply
that care must b~ taken in the interpretation of the resulta. An~ scceptance of a job5
which cannot be fully explained by the individnal characterietice in their model, can
only be explained by the jump in the utility valne, eo the negstive valustion of total
leieure may have been only be the result of their reetrictive speáfication. Nevertheless,
their resulte iaduce ue aot to reetrict our ntility fnnction by the requirement that it is
decreasing in labour supply everywhere. Thie impliea that the reservation wage rate may
become negative in which caee any job offer ie acceptsble to the individud.
The reserntion wsge f(E) ie implicitly de8aed by the following equstion, the deriva-
tion of which can be found in append'u A:
~
~(E(E),w; E) - n(b fw,o;E) f Pf~~~ [Y(w,w;E) - ~(E(E),w;E)1 dF(w;~,r) (z.7)
in which v(w, p; E) ie the iadirect utility function which is the reeult of eubstituting the
labour eupply function into the direct utility fnnction. The indirect utility function ie
well-defined whenever the labour eupply fnnction ie poeitive, i.e. whenever the wsgerate
w exceede wo(e) which is defined by
~(wo(E), l~; E) - u(l~, 0; E) (z.8)
wo(e) ie the reserntion wage rste oí the etstic model without unemployment benefits
(p -a oo, b- 0). IS can easily be ehown thst the dynamic reservstion wage rate ~(E)
defined by (z.6) alwsys exceede the staticmodel reeervstion wagerate wo(e). Thie eneuree
that lsbour supply ie poeitive whenever w~~(E).
Ia words, the reserntioa wsge rate ie the wage rste which equatee the value of the
indirect utility function to the eum of the direct utility value of being nnemployed and
the ezpected gain of receiving wsge offere in the future.
Under the above sseumptione it ie s general reeult that the distribution of completed
epells of unemployment, conditioasl on e, ie exponential with escape rate B(E), which
looeely epeaking equsle the probability oí gettiag an acceptablejob offer.
B(E) - aF(f(E)) (z.9)
The density function of a completed epell of unemployment, conditional on e, ie
k(t~e) - B(E)exp{-B(e)t},0 L t G o0 (z.10)
In the formulation of the likelihood function the sampling scheme hae to be tsken into
account. In practice, usually two eampling methods sre distinguished, i.e. eampliag the
flow and esmpling the etock. In the flow esmple the observation period etarte st s certain
point in time whereafter all individuaL who become unemployed after the beginning of
the obeervation period are drawn into the eample and their completed epelle are observed.
There msy be right haad ceneoring becanse the unemployment epell hse not ended before
the end ofthe obeervation period. Thie type of eampliag ie moet straightíorward because
we can directly use the dietribation of completed epelle. In the etock eampling echeme
we take a given point in time and eample individuale who are unemployed st that point
in time from the etock of unemployed. We aseume that we can obeerve both how loag
they have already beea uaemployed (i.e. the backward recurrence timea) and how long6
they will be unemployed from the point of eampling oa (the forwsrd recurreace times),
sgain with poasible right hand ceneoriag. Suppoae that the backward recurrence time ia
indicated by p and the forward recurtence time by r which impliea that the total apell
of unemploymeat t ia the eum of p snd r. Now different rontea in the formulstion of the
likelihood fnnction can be followed. We can formnlate the joint diatribution of forward
and backward recurrence timee, in which caae we either hsve to model the process of
inflow in the atate of uaemployment, or hsve to make the asaumption that the inflow
tate ie constant. The aecond poaeibility ie to condition oa the backward recurrence time
in which case we do not have to make aeenmptiona abont the iaflow rate. The latter
procedure will be followed in this paper. In the caee without unobserved heterogeneity
the backward recurrence times simply drop out because of the etatioaarity ueumption.
For eaee of exposition the likelihood contributioa for the flow aample will be derived
firet and it ie eupposed that the observation period, which etarte with the begianing of
the unemployment epell for individuaL in the flow sample ie of length M.
During the observstion period the individual csn be obaerved to accept a job or not.
If no job ie accepted during the obaervation period, the only information we have ie that
the duratioa of the unemployment apell laets longer than the observation period. Then
the likelihood contribution of snch an individual ie given by
~ulrÍlE) - exP{-B(E)M} (2.11)
where n ie the vector of psrsmetere. If E hae a deneity function g(.; o;) then the condi-
tioning on E can be removed by eimply iategrating out e. The uncoaditional likelihood
contribution becomea „
~a(rI) - f CxPl-B(E)M~9(E~Oa)(lE (i ..1Z)
w
For individnals who accept a job during the observation period we can distinguish
between individuala whoae after unemployment epell wage rate and hours are obaerved
and iadividuale whoee job characteristica sre nnobeerved. The optimal labour eupply
h' for aa individual with wsge rate w and non-lsbour income p ie given by the labour
eupply function
h' - h(w, p; E) (2.13)
Recall thst optimal labour aupply ie alwaye poeitive for wage rstea exceeding the reser-
vation wage rate. If we aseume that obeerved labour aupply h ie meaaured with a
multiplicative measurement error exp(v), -oo G v G oo, the deneity of obeerved labour
supply, coaditional on the wage rate and the random taete parameter can be derived
from the denaity of ineasurement error v, by making the transformation
h - h(w,p;e)exp(v) (2.14)
Let the resulting denaity function be denoted by r(h~w, E). If an individual is observed
to be working at a wage w and houra h thie means that the obaerved wage rate must
excced the reservation wage rate ~(E) which meane that the deneity of observed wagea,
conditional on E, is truncated. The likelihood contribution of individuals who accepted
a job aad whose after spell wagea and houra are observed and are equal to w and h7
respectively, and whose unemployment dnratioa equals t, coaditiond on E, is given by
!o,(g~E) - B(c) exp{-B(E)t}r(h~w, e) T(~É~, 0 G t G M, A~ O, w~ T(E) (2.15)
- 0 otherwise (2.18)
where T(E) is the truncation probability which is defined bq:
T(E) - ~(f(E)) ~f(E) ~ O (2.17)
- 1 if~(E) c 0 (2.18)
To remove the conditioning on e we have to integrate over all valuea of E for which
w 1~(e). The uncoaditional likelihood contribution becomes:
Iml~) - f 9(E) eacp{-9(E)t}r(á~wf E)~~E~g(Ef Oi)dE, t~ O, ÍL ~ O,w~ 0 (2.19)
where
I„ - {c~~(E) G w} (2.20)
For some of the individnals who are observed to sccept a job during the observation
period the sfter spelljob charactezistics may be unobserved. Ia that case the unobeerved
tute parameter will be inteórated out aad the likelihood conttibution becomes
!~,(q) - f m9(E)eap{-9(E)t}g(E,O~)dE,O G t c M (2.21)
Now we retura to the formulation of the likelihood contributioae of the individuale in
the stock ssmple. The poiat of right hand censoriag M now is the length of the period
which etsrts at the point of sampling and ends at the end of the observatioa period.
As said before, we conditiort oa the backwsrd recurrence time p, which implies that
we condition oa duration t beiag longer than p. As a reault, we eimply hsve to divide
the likelihood contribution derived sbove by the probability that t exceede p, see e.g
Ridder (1984). The implicii aesumption on the inflow rate which is made in following
this procedure is that the inflow rste into the etate of uaemployment does aot depend
on the unobserved raadom variable E. '
P(t ~ p) - f~ exp{-B(E)p}g(e,o;)dE
~
(2.22)
where in (2.11) and (2.12) M has to be replsced by p t M aad the region for t in (2.15)
and (2.21) becomes p G t G p f M.
2.2 Simulation estimators for models with unob8erved het-
erogeneity
In this section two simulation eatimators for modele with unobserved raadom vari-
ables which need to be integrated out are discussed. The first method simulates the8
vector of scores of the log-lilcelihood funetion in euch a way that the rezulting simu-
lsted ecore vector haa expectation sero st the trne parameter vector. A drawback of
the method ie thst random variables need to be drawn from the distribution of the
unoberved rsndom vsriable, conditiond on the observed rsndom variable. The denom-
inator of the expression for the coaditional density fuaction of the nnobserved random
variable, wnditional on the observed random varisble, is the marginal deasity function
of the obeerved variable and thie deneity containa the integral whoee evaluation we want
to avoid by making nee of eimulation techniqnes. Drawing from e.g. the marginal distri-
bution introduces a bias in the eimulstion of the vector of scores and ae s conaequence
the reaulting eztimator will be incoasietent. The eecond method, to be coasidered be-
low, ie called smooth eimulated maximum likelihood estimation (SSML) ae described by
Bórsch-Supan and Hajivsssiliou (1991).
The likelihood function preeented in the previouz section ie of the type in which an
unobserved random variable ie integrated out. Let the unknown random variable be
denoted by x with marginal deneity f(x~rl) and let the observed random variable, or
vector of random vartiablee be denoted by y, with deneity function conditional on x given
by j(y~z; rf), in which r~ is the vector of parametere. The log-likelihood contributioa of a
aiagle individual ie given by
L(nly) -1n ~f„f(vlx;n)f(x;n)dx~ (2.2a)
Suppoee that by traneformation the iategral can be written ae
L(nly) - ~ ~f „f(ylY;n)~(u)du~ (2.24)
where ~(.) ie a deneity function which does not depend on the parametere of intereet. In
the context of the previoue section dln!„(rI) has the form of L(rl~y), where d ie a dummy
variable taking on the value 1 for uncompleted spells and the value 0 for completed
epelle. Adding over all individua]s the log-líkelihood function becomes
I N Í~
L(n, y~, ...,ytv) - 1V ~ln
`J-„f( y:~u; n)~(u)du) (2.25)
seeuming that the y; are i.i.d. It ie a well known property of the log-likelihood function
that the expectation of the vector of ecozee equale zero st the true psrameter vector rb.
It ie thie property thst is exploited in the derivation of moment conditione. The vector
of ecorea ie:
1 eL(niy~,...,yN) - I " .I~~ef(y.lu;n)l~nm(u)d~ 22s N e,! N~ f~ f(y:~u; n)~(u)du ( )
The problem ie that the integral appeare in both the aumerator and the denominator
and if we want to exploit the poesibility of keeping the number of drawinge R, used in
the eimulation, emall, the eimulator hae to eater the moment conditione linearly, see,
e.g. Gouriéroux and Montfort (1989). A eimulator can be conetructed in the following
way. Draw R i.i.d. random numbere u;, from f(.~y;), the deasity of u conditional on9
the observed value y;, for every individual i, i- 1, ..., N, and use the moment functions
S(n; yi, uit, ..., utx, i - 1, ..., N):
S u:l, ..., utR, i- 1, ..., N) - 1 1 ~~ 8f(y:~u(r; ri)~ai (2.27) (n;yi, NR f(yi~u. ~ i:i r-1 ,r; ~)
To ahow that S(.) has the same expectation properties as the true vector of ecores,
we take the expectation with respect to the drawings u;r, thereby conditioning on the






E(S(.)~yr, i - 1, ..., N) - .
1 1 t-N.~ ~` 8.~(3~(~u(r;rl)~~1~(u;r)duir- 1~.f-ooaf(yi~u;7)a'al~(u)du (2.29)
N R:J-Ji r-1 ~~ !m!(yilu; n)~(U)du N :el foo llyilu; n)~(t!)du
which equals the true vector of acores. As a consequence, at the true parameter vector
qo the simulated moments conditions have expectations zero. In (2.12) we simulate of
courae only one term of the acore vector, i.e. the derivative of
N ~d;ln (I ~exp(-9(e)M)g(e,o~)de) (2.30)
,-i
In the aimulator of this expresaion, when taking the expectation w.r.t. the drawinge E;r,
we have to condition on d;, i - 1, ..., N.
The problem is that in general there is no rule of drawing random numbers from the
conditional denaity (2.28) without having to evaluate the integral in the denominator of
(2.28), which we do want to avoid by using simulation methods. In practice the only
thing onecan do ia to appmximate the procedure ofdrawing random numbers from (2.28)
by uaing an approximate diatribution. The most atraightforward choice ofapproximation
ia to draw the random numbers form the marginal distribution ~(.) of u. At the same
time this is also the moat naive way of approximating the drawing of random numbers
from the conditional distribution because any information about the observed values y; ia
ignored. We now inveatigate the bias which is introduced if the momenta (2.27) are used
with draws u;r from the marginal denaity ~(.). Firat of all note that the bias, i.e, the
difference between of the expectation of (2.27) at the true parameter vector and zero,
could be avoided by introducing a weight factor w(u;r), like in importance sampling,
which ie the ratio of the true density function (2.28) and the density one actually drawa
írom, in this case the marginal denaity function ~(.).
f(uir~yí) - !(yi~uiri~)
w(u~r) - d(uir) !~f(yilu;n)~(u)du
(2.31)lo
which sgain containe the intcgral to be timulsted. So in order to inveetigate the bias, we
have to look at the consequencee of ignoring the weight function. Note that the expecta-
tion of the weight function equals one by con~truction. Ae a con~equence, the sise ofthe
bise is closely related to the variance of the weight function. The emaller the variance
of the weight function, the amaller will be the bias ia the eimalated ecore equatione, see
e.g. Kloek and Van Dijk (1978). (Note thst the weight function ie identically equal to
one if the u;, are drawn from the conditional deneity function f(.~y;)). The expectation
of the equare of the weight function ie given by:
E„{(w(u))~} - f ~(w(u)]~~(u)du-f~w(u)f(u~y;)du (2.32)
The addition to the score vector of individuals who sccepted a job but whoee after
epell job characterietice are unobserved can be simulated in exactly the eame way. If
however, the bounde of the integral are a fuaction of the parametere, like ia (2.19), an
additionel complication arisee, i.e. we have to tske the derivativee with respect to the
bounds. Suppoee we have a likelihood addition given by
L; - ln ~i~l f(y;~u;rl)~(u)du (2.33)
[~a(n)
Then the derivatives are:
[~f(y;lá(vT n)~(~:(n)) - ~`~f(v;la(n);n)~(a;(v))] Já~~ef(y.lu;n)l~n~(u)du f
!~~if(y:lu;n)~(u)du ~~~i f(v.lu;o)~(u)au
(2.34)
The secoad part can be eimulated in exactly the same way a~ described before, preeuming
that it ie poesible to draw raadom aumbers n;, from (a;(~),b;(n)), without having to uae
an acceptance~rejection scheme. The first part represents the derivativee of the proba-
bility of being inside the region (a;(q), b;(n)), leaving the density unaffected, which can
etraightforwardly be calculated provided that the bounds are known ezplicitly. Howver,
this is not the case in the previous section. Therefore, it is proposed to integrate ont t,
w and h and replace the derivative with respect to the bounds by
W B~~E)
~1 - ezp{-B(E)M}] f(~(E)) 9(E,Q:)de (2.35) - f~ e~l T(f(E))
The motivation behind thie expression can be found ia appendix C. In executing this
procedure we have to incur an efficiency loes. However, Lhe expressioa can etill be seea
ae s good representative for the derivstive of the probability of being in the required
region. Simulation of the expression ie etraightforward.
A second simulation estimator caa be obtained by simulating the likelihood function
rather than looking st the vector of acores. The iategrals which appear in (2.25) are
replaced by s eimulstor. Unbiasedeimnlstorefor the integrale can be obtained by drswing
random numbere u;, from the marginal density ~(.) and calculating
R
R ~ f(y:~u~.;n) (2.36)
r11
Becauee of the logarithmic transformstion in (2.25) the resultiag eetimstoi will he incon-
eietent for a fixed snd emall value of R, which actnally ia the reason why we considered
aimulstion eetimators based on the vector of ecora before. However, if the timulstor is
a emooth fnnction of the psrametere, which ie the caee here, the method functione sat-
isfactory even for emaller valuea of R. Thie is shown in Bórech-Supan aad Hsjivaasiliou
(1991) in which they call this method emooth eimulated maumnm likelihood eetimation,
where they have added the word "emooth" in order to strees the íact that one needs s
eimulator which ie s emooth funetion of the parametere rather than a frequency type of
simulstor in order to get s satiefactory performaace.
2.8 Speciflcation
In thie eubsection a epecific functional form for the direct utility function ie choeen,
from which the labour supply function and the indirect utilitq function can be derivcd.
We uee the direct utility functioa of Hausmsn (1980).
n(v, h; E) - - ln(ry - ~h) - ~(h - 7ó ~h - ~y)~~ G 0, ry ~ 0 (2.37)
where e ie seeumed to be normally dietributed with mean aero and variance o; snd X ie s
vector ofindividual charscterietics. Note thst ntility ie increaeing in iacome as required
by aesnmption 6. It can easily be verified that the eewnd condition of aesumption 6 ie
also estiefied.
Maximisiag utility eubject to the income equstion for the employed yielde s linear
labour eupply function in which the dieturbance term equale the unobeerved random
taste parameter:
h(w~l~; E) -~l~ t ryw f X6 t e (2.38)
The virtnal wage rate we(e), for which optimal labour eupply ie ezactly eqnal to sero,





Note thst there are no poeitivity conetraints on thie value. The dynamic reservatioa
wage f(e) will always be highet than thie value. Inserting the labour eupply function
(2.38) into the direct utility fnnction (2.37) yielde the expreseion for the indirect utility
function:
v(w, ~; e) - - ln(ry - ~X b - ~e - ~ryw - ~rp) - ~w (2.40)
which ie well defined for all w~ wo(e) and therefore for all w~~(e).
The wsge offer distribution ie tsken to be log-normal with log-mean ~'x and log-
variance r reepectively, where x ie a vector of iadividual charscteristice. Meaeurement
error v ie aasumed to be normally dietributed with mesn zero and varisnce v;. The error
v allowe for difference between optimal lsbour eupply, generated by the labour supply
function (2.38), and observed labour eupply. The job offer arrival rate can also be made
dependent on a vector of characterietice z by epecifying
J1 - ezp(Kz) (2.41)12
Characteristics which may influence the arrival rate of job offere are individual charac-
teriatice like age and sector of education, as well aa characteristiu of the environment of
the individual like the geographical situation.
2.4 The data
The data are obtaiaed from the Socio-Ecoaomic Panel (SEP), which ie a eurvey
camed out in the Netherlands every half a yesr ia April and October by the Central
Bureau of Statistice (CBS). In the survey the participating individuale are asked to report
their occupational etatue for every month ia the past half year. The data which are ueed
are those ofthe wave of the eurvey in october 1985 up to the wave in october 1987, which
implies thst the observation period is two and a half years. Selected are male individuals
who reported to be unemployed in any month during the observation period, which
means that the sample partly has a stock character and partly a flow character. It has
beea detezmined how many months they remained unemployed, and for the individuals
in the stock sample the backward recurrence timu are gathered as well. For most of the
individuale whose unemployment spell ended duriag the observation period, data on their
after spell hourly wage rate and the wcekly number of hours are available. The sample
coasiste of 516 individuala The number of complete unemployment spelle ie 272. The
remainiag 244 epelle are truncated. For 211 ofthe 272 individuale whose unemployment
spelle are completed the after epell job charscterietice, i.e. the hourly wage rste and the
wcekly number of working hours, are observed.
Looking at the data oa the completed unemployment spells we see that peake in the
frequencies of unemployment duratione can be found every half a year in the monthe
where the survey on the precediag half year ie conducted. In fignre 2.1 the frequencies
of the completed unemployment epelle of the flow sample and the forward recurrence
timee of the etock sample aze plotted aad the peake are at duration levels of 6, 12, 18
and 24 months. The peak observatione sre apparently the result of misreporting and
ae e result the data on unemployment duratione in unite of one month are unreliable.
Therefore, the durations in units of oae month are divided into groups of half a year.
The likelihood contribution then becomes the probability that the unemployment spell
ends eomewhere in the observed interval of helí s year.
In table 2.1 eome sample etstistics are givea. In the survey there are five levels of
education where level 1 is the lowut and level 5 the highut. The mode of the level of
education ie 2. We have divided the Netherlande into four regione. Region 1 is the moet
etrongly iaduatris.lized part of the Netherlaade which includes the larger citiu. Region
4 is the leset industrialized part of the Netherlande with a relatively low population
density and a eizeable agricultural sector. R.egion 3 is the south of the Netherlande
which containe some large companiu and agricultural induetty. Ia region 2(the east)
there ie s mix of iadustry and agriculture. Apart from having information about the l~yg]
of educatioa we have information available about the type or eector of education. Sector
1 ie the techaical eector which includee chemice, phyeice, mathematice and biology, sector
2 includu the economic and adminietrative directioae, eector 3 ie geaeral education and
eector 4 indudu servicee.
In table 2.2 estimatee obtained with simulated maximum likelihood, using R- 1013
drawinge ue preeented. According to the atimata of the utility psrameters, optimal
labour eupply ie not very eeaeitive with rapect to non-lsbour income and the wage rate.
The wage elaeticity of labour snpply ie 0.0998. Family aize hae a poeitive effect oa the
optimal amount of lsbour supply. Age hae s negative effect oa the job offer amval
rste, i.e. the older one ie, the fewer job offen can be ezpected. The nationality dummy,
which is one for those who do aot have the Dutch nstionality, ie aegstive, iadicating that
having the Dutch nstionality ïnfluenca thejob offer amval rste poeitively. The regional
dummia hsve a poetive eign, which meaae s higher job offa arrival rste for pcople
living outside the agricultural region 4. Ody the dummia for region 1 and regioa 3
are eignificant. Living in the induetrial wat ie a~eociated with a higher job offer arrival
rate than living in the rat of the country. Only the eectoral dummy for sector 3 which
includa thoee individuale who only had a general type ofeducation, i.e. no spepalisation
in a certain profeseion, is significsat. The highat wagee ue offered to the individuale
with the highat level of educstion.
The parameter atimste of p ie 0.00492. Ae unemployment duratioa is measured in
months, thie meane that the moathly dieconnt rate ie 0.49qo, or equivalently, the discount
rate is 5.901o per yesr.
Ae noted before, atimstee obtained by Narendrsnsthsn sad Nickell ( 1985) and Van
den Elerg ( 1990e) ~hewed ttiat unempluyment, Lr.. total lelwure, war aeeignpd a h~war
utility vslue than employment. Their reeervation wage equstion ie of the form
m
u(f f p) - ~ru(6 f~) - P~ (u(x) - u(f)) dF(x) (2.42)
in which m ie the utility parameter whoae atimata hsve bcen found to be lae than one.
Now aote that the right hand eide of (2.42) ie alwsye positive from which we csa derive
thst
u(f f F~) 1~u(6 f 1~) (2.43)
Now ~~ 1 implia that the reeervation wage rste f is alwsye higher than the benefit rate
b. However, if m C 1, the reeervstion wage rate ie allowed to be lower than the benefit
rste. Of course, s valne of the reeervation wage rste which ie actually below the benefit
rste indicatee thst unemployment muet have a lower utility value than employment. Our
epecificstioa hae enough fle~bility for the labour income st the reservation wage rste to
be below the income from benefite, but at the eame time it caanot be checked directly by
looking at s eingle puameter whether unemploymeat ie valued lower thsn employment.
Therefore, it maka eeaee to run a eimulstion by drswing random preferenca E for each
iadividusl, calculating the raervation wsge rate E(e), computing the optimal lsbonr
income at the reeervatioa wsge rate if ~(E) ~ 0, i.e. f(e)~i(E(c),{~; E) aad compariag it
with the benefit income b. This procedure wu repeated 100 times and the rault is that
for 87íó oí the esmple the reeervation income ie lower than the benefit income. The
reseon for thie high percentsge ie the fsct that 70010 of the individuale ia the eample
ie working sbout 40 houre a week. In the coatezt of thie model, in which individuaL
are aesumed to chooee their amount of labour eupply optimally, this meaas that these
individuaL sre working 40 houre a week becauec they yj~ to work 40 houre a week. Ae
s coaeequence, the virtual wsge rate wo(E), given ia (2.39), ie relatively low. Although
the reservation wsge rste ~(e) slwsys exccede the virtual wage rste, these individual14
preferences with respect to labour supply result in a low reservation wage rate as well.
This result is consistent with the findings of Nsrendranathan and Nickell (1985) and Van
den Berg (1990c) who have estimated a value of r.r in (2.42) thst is emaller thsn 1, i.e.
unemployment lowers utility.
Table 2.1 Sample statistics
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TABLE 2.2 ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH
SIMULATED MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD, R- 10
THE UTILITY PARAMETERS
Q -2.479 x 10-5 1.301 x 10-5
y 0.378 0.251
b~, Constant 32.076 2.454
bz, Log family size 2.064 1.790
o~ 1.488 0.0286
THE JOB OFFER ARRIVAL RATE PARAMETERS
rc~, Constant 0.462 0.320
~c2i Log age -0.215 0.478
K3i Nationality -0.958 0.351
K4, Region 1 0.676 0.202
~5, Region 2 0.312 0.195
~6, Region 3 0.470 0.204
~c~, Sector 1 -0.0748 0.218
k8, Sector 2 -0.293 0.304
~9, Sector 3 -0.546 0.214
~c~o, Square of log age -0.235 0.604
RATE OF TIME PREFERENCE
p 0.00492 1.008
THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION
~1, Constant -12.084 3.135
~~, Log age 8.088 1.874
~3, Square of log age -1.104 0.279
~4i educl -0.329 0.0856
~S, educ2 -0.289 0.0789
~ei educ3 -0.165 0.0797
r 0.293 0.0104
DISTR. OF MEASUREMENT ERROR
o„ 0.312 0.090917
3 Job search with hours restrictions
3.1 The model
In general when looking at pietures of frequeacy dietributioae of labour supply data
one can hardly maintaia the aeeumptioa that theee dsta can be deecribed by a etsndsrd
aeo-claseical micro-econometric labour eupply model. Spikee can be obeerved in the
empirical probability msee functioae at weekly anmbeze of honn like 40. In the literature
there exiet different explanatione for the presence of thie wncentration of labour eupply
at eertain amounts of houre, but all these explaaations have in common that they,
in oae way or another, refer to the demand side of the labonr muket. The theory of
compeaeating wage differeatials, see for example Abowd aad Asheafelter (1981), aeaumea
that employere offer houre quaatities like 40 and that employere are compenested by
meane of s higher wage rate for the lose in utility they experience by bàag over- or
underemployed. Becsuse of thie compeaestion the individual ie not coaetrained in the
eense that the esme utility level ie acquired ae in the case in which the individual could
determiae houre by utility ma~rimizstion without wsge compeneation. The emphaeie ie
on the wage function, which describea wagee ae a function of houre, rather than on a
lsbour eupply fuaction. Although it ie plaueible that iadividuale withia thàr job are
compensated for working overtime houre, over and sbove the amount of houte agreed to
ia the labour coatract, it ie doubtful whether wsge rstee at epike levele are syetemstically
higher. Eepecially ia an economy with nnemployment the employere need aot to raise
wsgee in order to eatiefy thàr demaad for labour.
The second point of view, lhen, ie that individuale are not compeneated for bàng
undez- or overemployed. Moffitt (1982) reeognises that there e~rist relatively few jobe
with hours in the part time range. He modele thie by adapting the etandard Tobit model.
Dickeas and Lundberg (1985) aesume thst individuale sre conetraiaed by the houre that
are offered to them by the employere. Thàr fzamework ie etatic aad aseumee that at
a point in time the individuale recàves a raadom amount of job offere (poeubly sero)
from which they chooee the offer which yielde the higheet level of utility. Thie utility
level is compared with the utility of not workiag, after which it ie decided whether or
aot to accept the job. All job otfere have the eame groes wage rate but msy differ in
the number of houre. The houre offer dietribution ie modelled by mesae of s diecrete
probsbility distribution. The idea was applied by Thmmere and Woittiez (1991), Van
Soat, Woities and Kapteyn (1990). Bloemen (1991) dropped the saeumption of haviag
the eame wage rate for every job offer. In fact, hie model can be interpreted as s static
version of the model preeented here. ~
Inetead ofjobe arriviag at a given poiat ia time, we now seeume thst job offere arrive
eequentially, like in the previous section. But in contraet, a job offer aow coaeiete of
both a wage rate and sn amount oí weekly working houra. Individuale will evalnate the
utility level ofjobe, compariag them with the valne of not sccepting thejob taldng into
sccount poesible future job offere. Individnale sre coaetrained in houre offered to them
and therefore, unlike the etandard job eearch framework, the wsge rate ie not the only
job characterietic which ie needed to decide whether or not to accept s job. Instead
of hsviag a reeervation wage it can be derived that there euete a unique reservation18
utility level. Jobs, i.e. wage-hours combinations, which generate a utility level which is
higher than the reservation utility level are accepted, those with a utility level below are
rejected.
More formally, assumption 1 in section 2.1, which statea that individuals are utility
maximizera in the neo-claseical sense, is replaced by the asaumption that hours arrive
from an houra offer diatribution, juat like the wage rate. The equation for the reservation
utility level is derived in appendix B. It ie given by
u(e) - u(6 t p, 0; e) ~ ~ I~ J~ [u(wh f p, h; e) - u(E)]f(w, h)dwdh (3.1)
P o f(h.u(~Ac)
where u(e) is the reservation utility level at random taste parameter e, f(w, h) is the
joint wage-hours offer distribution and ~(h, u(e); e) is the wage rate which generates
utility level u(c) at hours h. The wage rate ~(h, u(e); e) can be interpreted as an hours
dependent reservation wage rate. The eign of the derivative of {(h, u(c); c) with respect
to hours h depends on whether the individual is over- or underemployed at wage level
~(h, u(e); e) and the given value of hours. If an individual is overemployed an increase
in hours moves utility further away from its unconstrained value and consequently the
hours dependent reservation wage rate rises, thereby increasing the reluctancy to accept
a job. And vice versP for underemployment. As a reault the reservation wage rate does
not depend on hours if the individual is not constrained in the choice o[ hours, whicL
leads back to the model in section 2.
In case of a discrete hours offer distribution the outer integral ia replaced by summa-
tion.




Taking into account the different functional form of the escape rate, the likelihood con-
tributions oí individuals who did not accept a job during the observation period and
those who did, but whose after spell wage rate and houra are not observed, are the same
as in the previous section in (2.12) and (2.21) respectively. For the individuals whose
after spell wage-hours pair ie observed to be (w, h), and, again, the observed wage rate
is truncated, conditional on houra and on e, which leads to the likelihood contribution,
conditional on e:
l~(rl~e) - B(e) exp{-B(c)t}j(w, h)~Q(e),
0 e t C M,h 1 O,w ~ max{0,{(h,u(e);e)}
- 0 otherwiae (3.4)
where Q(e) is the truncation probability, given by
Q(e) - ~~ ~(~ u(`),() f(w, h)dwdh (3.5)19
The uncoaditional likelihaod function ie obtained by integratiag over those valuee of e
for which the utility level evaluated in (w, h) ezceede the reservation utility level.
!a.(n) - f- B(e) exp{-B(e)t} f~(' ~)g(E, o;)dE, t ~ 0, h~ 0, w~ 0 (3.6)
~ ~ E
where the eet I„~ ie given by
I,~~, - {e~u(wh ~ ~,h~e) ~ u(e)} (3.7)
The set I(w, h) has to be non-empty for every (w, h) with w ~ 0, h~ 0.
For the individuals in the etock tample the expreseion (2.22) for the probability of t
exceediag p can be used, taking into scconnt thst B(e) is now determined by (3.2).
3.2 SpeciBcation
For the utility function we take the epecificstion of section 2.3 given in (2.34). The
epikee in the empirical houre dietributioa euggeet the use of a diecrete hours offer dietri-
bution of the Dickene snd Lundberg (1985) type. However, we are hampered by the fsct
that 680!'0 of the observed labour supply ie st valuea of 38 or 40 houre a week, making
it impossible to identify probabilities of low or high levels of labour supply. Therefore,
only a rongh dietinctioa ie made betweea part time jobe (32 hours or lese), full time jobs
of normalleveL (33 to 44 hours a week) snd full time jobe of high levele (more thaa 44).
The hours sre cstegoriaed in classes of four, which yielde 20 claetes of houre from 1 to
80. The probability of gettiag a job offer from clase 1 ie given by
p(h - ht) - Pt,! - 1,...,m,m - 20 (3.8)
The probabilities can psrametrised by
p~ I- 1 m m- 20 (3.9) PI - ,~ , , ..., ,
~i-1 F~i
where the normalization
~ - 1 (3.10)
is made. The distinction made between part time and full time jobe can be ezpressed in
the following reetrictione:
pl -... - ps : psrt time jobe (3.11)
py - I~lo - l~11 : normal full time jobe (3.12)
I~lr -... - I~ro : high leve! jobe (3.13)
Again, it ie aeeumed thst wages arive from s log-aormal wage offer dietribution with
log-vsriaace r and log-mean {'x. The wage offer deneity function ie
f(w) - 1 1 exP {- 1(law - t'x]~} , 0 G w G oo (3.14)
- 2ar w 2r~ao
Usiag the diecrete hours offer dietribution aad the wage offer distributioa the reser-
vation utility equstion becomes
~ m
u(e) - u(b f{t,0; e) f-~ pt f (a(wht t{t, hr; e) - á(e)]f(w)dw (3.15)
P t-i f(M.u(~)~)
A eimilar expreasion can be found for the escape rate B(e):
m W ra
B(E) - a~Pt f f(w)dw - a~PiF(f(hr,u(E)~E)) (3.16)
r-i f(M.a(~),.) r-i
In the previous eection the assumption hse been made that only preferencee depend
on unobserved iadividual characterietice e. Now we will aseume that the job offer arrival
rate aleo depends oa an unobserved random variable q, known to the individual, which
is independent of e and which ie normally distributed with mean zero and variance Qá.
Inclusion of q in the job offer arrival rate at the same time ensures that the set I,~ti
defined in (3.7) ie non-empty, i.e. for every observed job offer (w, h) there eusts an e
euch that u(wh t p,h; e) 1 u(e) which is coneistent with the fact that we do observe
(w, h). The job offer arrival rate becomes
a(q) - ~P(K~z f 9) (3.17)
In table 3.1 estimates obtained with simulated maximum likelihood (SSML) using
R- 10 drawings are presented. This model generatee estimates of Q and ry which are
clearly different from the estimatee of the model ia the previous eection. The reason for
this is that ia the neo-classical model in section 2 the parameter estimates of the utility
function are mainly determined by the labour supply data, because of the assumption
that hours are chosen by the individua)e according to their preferences. In the neo-
claesical model the presence of a epike at 40 houre a week in the labour supply data caa
only be explained by inelastic labour eupply, whereas in the present model with hours
restrictione the alternative explanation for the epike is given by the presence of demand
eide restrictioas.
Again we see a positive effect of family sise. The variance oa of the unobserved
heterogeneity in the job offer amval rate is aot very large. From the regional dummies,
only the dummy variable for region 1, the induetrialiacd weetern part of the Netherlande,
ie eignificant. The only eignificaat sectoral dummy ie that for eector 3, which ie the sector
of individuals who are not epecialized in a certain profeseion. The sign of the estimate
ie negative.
The eetimate of p ie 0.688 which is equivalent to a monthly discount rate of almost
70'l0, which is rather high. In section 2.1, however, it was recogniaed that one should
be careful in interpreting the eatimate of p. For example, if assumption 5 in section 2.1
ie replaced by rhe assumption that there ie an exogenoue layoff rate, the estimate of p
should be interpreted as the sum of this layoff rste and the discount rate. Equivalently,
the ignorunce of other possibly relevanL labour market states changes the interpretation
of the estimate of p in a eimilsr way, ece e.g. Van den Berg (1990c).
To compsre the labour income evaluated at the reservation wage rate, we run the
same kiad of simulation procedure as in the previous section. We compare the expected21
reservation income with the benefit level 6. The ezpected reservstion income hse been
defined by:
m
~P~f(hi,u(E);E)h~l(f(h~,u(E);E) ~ 0) (3.18)
1-i
in which !(.) is the indiestor function. The number of replications is 100. For 98.T íó
of the number of individuals ia the sample, the expected reservation income in the
ssmple ie higher than the benefit level. This result is not consisteat with a disutility of
unemployment (~u G 1 in (2.42)). Aa ezplanstion for the low reservstion income in the
neo-classical model has alresdy been given ia eection 2.4. Apsrt from that explanation,
there is an additional ezplsnation why the raervation income defined in (3.19) may be
higher than the reservstion iIICOme in section 2.4. In eection 3.1 it has been ezplained
that the larger is the deviatioa ofbffered houn from optimal labour supply, the higher
will be the hours dependent reservation wage rste ~(h,u(e);e). The hours dependent
reeervation wsges sre higher beuuse the individual gets hours offere thst do not coincide
with optimal lsbonr supply. So even if the resetvation wages were evaluated in the
same parameter values for both models, the reserntion wage of the model with hours
restrictions will be higher than the rettrvation wage of the neo-claseical model. As the
hours offer probabilities are large ia the full time range, the reservation income in (3.19)
is likely to be higher thsa the aeo-classical reeerntion income as well.22
TABLE 3.1 ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH




ál, Constant 27.478 10.523
ë~, Log family siae 8.576 4.386
c. 21.334 14.945
THE JOB OFFER ARRIVAL RATE PARAMETERS
va 0.000963 0.228
rol, Constant 1.239 0.818
w~, Log age -0.327 0.585
ro~, Nationality -0.872 0.378
ro~, Region 1 0.720 0.257
Ks, Region 2 0.182 0.247
~, Region 3 0.232 0.258
Ki, Sector 1 -0.00988 0.250
Ks, Sector 2 -0.574 0.342
~, Sector 3 -0.572 0.248
K7o, Square of log age -0.230 0.114
RATE OF TIME PREFERENCE
p 0.688 3.576
THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION
(1f Coastant -12.502 3.181
(~, Log age 8.287 1.903
(~, Square of log age -1.129 0.284
(4f educl -0.320 0.0823
(s, educ2 -0.276 0.0776
(s, educ3 -0.144 0.0111
r 0.288 0.0111
PROBABILITIES OF HOURS DISTRIBUTION
pl -... - ps part time 0.0204 0.00373
ps -... - pll full time 0.251 0.0114
pl~ -... - pso high level jobs 0.00944 0.0021723
4 Residual analysis and simulated frequencies
In order to be able to eay eomethiag about the performsnce of the two modele we
will do some residual analyeie. An overview of reaidual aaalysis of duration modele caa
be found in Lancaater (1990) and Cox aad Oakes (1984). There are two pointe sccording
to which the etaadsrd reaidual analysie in duration modele csnnot be applied directly
to our models. The firet point ie that thie aaalysie ie ueually performed in the context
of a flow eample, wherese we have a eample whieh coaeiets of a flow subeample se well
as a etock eubesmple. Therefore, in the analyeie of the reeiduals we restrict oureelvee
to the individuale who ue in the flow eubeample. The eecond point ie that reeidusl
aaalyeie is ueually períormed on models which do not contsin s rsndom unobserved
heterogeneity component. Thie problem ie solved in the following way. The msrginal
deneity of obeerved duratioa t ie given by f(t).
f(t) - f mB(É)exp{-B(É)t}g(É,o;)dÉ,O G t G oo (4.1)
The deneity of the unobserved heterogeneity variable E, conditional on observed duration
t ie givea by
g(EIt) -
me(E)CXp{-B(E)t}g(EfOi)
,-00 G E G 00 (4.2)
f m B(~) CxP{-B(É)t}g(É,?~ )dE
Now draw s random number E, from g(.~t). This can be done by ueing the invereion
method, eee e.g. Devroye (1986). Thea the pair (t,E.) csn be seen ae a joint draw from
f(t)g(Elt) - B(E) tSP{-B(E)t}g(E, Oa), U G t G 00, -00 G E G 00 (4.3)
Coneider the followiag trsneformation:
r9 - B(E)t
4 4
E - E (~)
The jacobisn of te traneformatioa ie 1~B(E). The joint deneity of r9 and E becomea
f(e(E)) g(EIB( E)) -
exp{-á}9(E,Ot),~ G 1i G 00,-00 G E G 00 (4.5)
which impliee thst ~9 ie expoaentially dietributed with puameter 1, which enablee us to
apply the etandard reaidual analyeie. Summarising, the procedure ie:
~ Drsw E, from g(.~t), where g(.~t) ie evaluated in the parameter eatimates sad t ie
obeerved duration
a Calculste 119, - B(E,)t - B(E„n)t in which B(E.) ie the haaard rate evaluated in the
parameter eetimste n. r9, is the eimulated residual. For every individual, several
residuale can be calculated by drswiag eeveral random numbere.
~ Calculate the Kaplan-Meier eetimate of the rurvivor fuaction in the reeiduale
d„,i- 1, ..., N, r- 1, ..., R, ia which the eubindex i ie over individuale snd the
eubiadex r is over different draws from the conditional deneity.24
The residuale csn be plotted against miaue Lhe logarithm of the Ksplan-Meier estimate.
If the parametric model is correctly epecified, the plot would be approximstely a 45
degree line. Various forme of misspecification of the hazard rate can cauee the residual
plot to deviate from the 45 degree line. Laacaster (1990) ehows that omittiag aa un-
obeerved heterogeneity factor in the hazard rate leade to underdispersion, i.e. the plot
will be below the 45 degree line. In particular intereetiag for our application are the
deviations which are caueed by wrongly sseuming thst the hasard rste ie conetant, i.e.
the etatioasrity sseumption. Ridder (1987) ehows that when the data inhibit poeitive
duration dependence, whereae a coastant hassrd model is estimsted, the residual plot
will be above the 45 degree liae. In case of aegstive duratioa dependence of the hazard
rate the reverse holda.
For every individual, five residuala have been simulated. Figure 4.1 shows the plot
of minus the logarithm of the Kaplan-Meier eetimate versus the residuals for model 1,
whose eetimatee were preeented in table 2.2. Figure 4.2 shows the same plot íor model
2, based on the estimates ia table 3.1. For both modele the plot ie above the 45 degree
line, indicating thst there could be poeitive duration dependence. However, for model
2 the deviations are much lese severe than for model 1. In the figures 4.3 and 4.4 the
Kaplan-Meier survivor functioae and the exponential survivor functione are plotted. The
plote reveal that even though the parameter eetimates of the job offer arrival rate show
similar effects for both modele, the misepecification of model 2, in which individuale are
fsced by hours restrictione on the labour market, is much less severe than in model 1.
Figure 4.5 showe the frequency dietribution of eimulated houre, conditional on ob-
eerved wages, for model 1, the model without houre reatrictione, and the sample fre-
quenciec of observed hours. In thie figure houre are divided in three categories, i.e, part
time jobe, full time jobe and high level jobe, and the frequencies ehown in the figure
are Lhe frequenciee of theae categoriee. The dietinction between the categories has been
described ia section 3.2. The density of houra, conditional on wages can be derived from
(2.19). It is given by
T Ít 7U
~I. r(h ltif E)T'e g(E~~a)dE'
0 C~1 C 00 (4.Ó)
( ~ ) -
fl. T~g(E~ ~i
)dE
To eimulate labour supply, conditional on the obeerved wagerate, Eis drawn from g(E, v~)
restricted to the region I„. Optimal labour supply can then be calculated from (2.13)
or, more specific, from (2.38), after which s meaenrement error v is drawn to eimulated
observed labour eupply by (2.14).
Figure 4.6 ehowe the frequency dietribution of simulated houre for model2, the model
with houre reetrictions, and the eample distribution of observed houra. The dietribution
of hours for the aecond model can be derived from (3.6). It ia given by
Pi f ~ F(~(ha~E)~E))9(E,v.)dE,l - 1,...,m (4.7)
These are the probsbilitiee of obeerving á~,1 - 1, ..., m. A value for E ie drawn from
g(E, v`), which makee it poseible to calculate u(E). Then
F(f(hi,~E); E))pi (4.8)
Q(E)25
ie calculated for !- 1,...,m. Uniform rsndom vsristes on the interval (0,1), together
with the probsbilities in (4.8), ue uaed to determine s ámulated value for hi. Comparing
figure 4.5 with figure 4.8, we eee that for the model with houn ratrictions the sample
distribution of obrerved houre ie fitted mnch better than for the model without houn
rdtriction~.
Figure 4.7 ehowe the frequenciee of eimulated wages and the umple frequencia of
wagee for model 1. Again, the density of ob~erved wagee for model 1 can be determined
from (2.19). It is given by
~- T~E~9(E,o~)de,0 G w G oo (4.9)
A wage rste is simulated by fitst drawiag a value for e from g(e, o;) and calculsting
~(e), sfter which a wage rate is drawa from f(w), rettricted to the region (~(E),oo). For
model 2 the frequencies of eimulated wages can be fouad in figure 4.8. The muginal
distribution of wages, derived from (3.6) ie
~p~I f(?~l o)9(E,Q:)de,0 G w G o0
1-1 I.~, `V (E)
(4.10)
A value for h~ ie drawn from the houre offer di~tribution, c ie drawn from g(e,v;) after
which s wsge rate ie drawn from f(w) ratricted to the regioa (f(h~, u(e); e), oo). Com-
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5 Conclusions
Two modele of job search have been preaented. In the first model individuala can de-
termine their labour aupply optimally, given the wage rate. The second model asaumes
that the individual is faced by houre reetrictione on the labour market. It has been
ahown that these two different model aseumptione have different implicatioae for the job
acceptsnce decision of individuals. Parameter estimatea of the job offer amval rate ahow
aimilar effecte for both modele. Age hsa s negative effect on the job offer amval rate.
People who live in the indnatrialized weatern patt of the Netherlanda have a larger prob-
ability of getting a job offer. Individuals who sre not apecialized in a certain profession
have a lower chance of gettiag a job offer than other individuala. For individuals who
have the Dutch nationality the job offer amval rate is lsrger than for thoae who do not
have the Dutch nationa5ty.
For both modela the reeervation iacome for every individual has been eimulated and
compared with the benefit income. For the model without houre reatrictiona a large
percentage of the simulated reeervation incomee were below the benefit incomea. Thie ie
conaistent with reaulta of Van den Berg (1990c) who finda evidence in favour of "diautility
of unemployment". For the model with houra reatrictiona however, moat of the reserva-
tion incomee are above the benefit incomea. Two explanationa for the different reaulta
of the two modela have been given. The fuat ie that a constrained iadividual always hae
a higher (houra dependent) teaervation wage thsn an unconetrained individual, becauae
he has to choose from houra offere that do not coincide with optimal labour supply. The
second explanation ia that the apike in the eample distribution of weekly working houra
at a level of 40 houra a week, together with the asaumption of ftee choice in model 1,
lead to low eatimates of the virtual wage rate and conaequently lowera the lowerbound
of the reaervation wage rate.
Residual analyais ahowa that the hazard rste is poeaibly poaitive duration dependent,
i.e. the longer someone is unemployed, the larger is the eacape rate. Poaitive dura-
tion dependence of the haaard rate can be csused by negative duratioa dependence of
the reservation wage rate, posaibly due to negative duration dependence of benefit pay-
mente or poaitive bueineae cycle movemeata. Furthermore, the reaidual analyais reveals
aubatantial differencea between the two model apecificationa. The model in which the in-
dividual can freely choose his working hours eeema to be seriously miaspecified, whereas
the model with houra teatrictions ie doing reasonable, in apite of the heavy atationarity
aaeumptioa.
The eimulated frequenciee of part time joba, full time joba and high level joba reveal
that the poor performance of the model without houra reatrictione is mainly caused by
the asaumption made about labour aupply.31
A Derivation of reservation wage equation 2.6
Let V(E) deaote the value of eearch of an iadividual with unobserved taete ehifter E.
Due to the etationarity aseumption (aseumption 4 in eection 2.1), V(E) ie indepeadent
of time. At time t, the individual is not working, ie lookiag for a job and receivee
weekly noa-labour income ~ aad weekly benefite 6, which are time independent due to
aeeumption 4 in eection 2.1. In a ehort time iaterval of leagth Ot the utility flow derived




u(6 f p,0;E)e-á~-~)~ - u(b }~`~ Oi E) (1 - e-vet)
P
(A.1)
In the time interval of leagth At there ie s probsbifity of e-ao`a0t ~ o(Ot) of receiving
a job offer, coneisting of a wage rate w. The value of the job, denoted by W(w; E) will
be compsred with the value of continuing searching, which ie V(E). The job offer w will
be sccepted if W(m;E) exceede V(E). Due to the aeeumption 5 in eectioa 2.1, the value
will remain W(w; E) once s job w ie accepted. With probability 1- e-ao`aAt ~ o(At)
the individnal doee not get a job offer in the time interval of length At, in which case
the value remaiae at V(E). Summariaing, the valne V(E) ie
V(E) - u(6 t p,O;E)(1 - e'oet)~p-~ (A.2)
e'~et{(1 - e-ao`aAt)V(e) f e-ao`aOtEs max[V(E),W(w; E)]} ~ o(Ot)
Resrtanging terme yielde
1- e'~o` u 6 t O~e)(1 - e'"o`) o(Ot)
Ot V(E)-
( l~~ , QL }e-(afo)o~a~m~[O,W(w;E)-V(E)]f
Ot P
(A.3)
Letting Ot -~ 0 we obtain '
pV(E) - u(b f~, 0; E) .i- aEa max[0, W(w; E) - V(E)] (A.4)
Uung the aseumptione 1, 2, 4, 5 and B the vslue of the job with wage rate w can be
obtained by solving the maximisation problem
max u(y' hi E), subjcct to y- wh f~ (A.5)
e,A p
The eolution for h ie h' - h(m, p; E) which ie the neo-claseical labour eupply functioa.
Inserting the solutioa for y and á in the direct utility function yielde the iadirect utility
functioa which ie v(w,W; E) and therefore
W(w; E) - ~(w,l~i E) (A.6)
P
Ineerting (A.6) into (A.4) givee
PV(E) - 1L(b i- tC~ Oi E) f pE~i m~lOf Y(w~iai E) - PV(E)] (A.T)32
A job offer w will be accepted if v(t"u,p; e) 1 pV(e). If the reverae holds, it will be
rejected. Ae the indirect utility function is increasing ia the wage rate, there e~sta a
unique reservation wage rate f(e) such that all wsges above it are scceptable aad thoae
below will be rejected. The value of aesrch ia equal to the value of accepting a job if
PV(E) - ~(E(E),h;E) (A.g)
Inaerting (A.8) in (A.7) and ueing the dietributional asaumptiona on w reeulta in the
reaervstion wage equation:
m
v(f(E), p; e) - u(6 ~- p, 0; E) f P flcl[v(w,~; E) - v(f(E),P; E)]dF(w; r(~, r) (A.9)
B Derivation of the reservation utility equation 3.1
Let V(e) denote the value of search for an individual with unobaerved charscteriatics
e. While unemployed the individual receives weekly benefits b. The amouat of non-
labour income is {~. The flow of utility, derived from benefit level b aad non-labour
income p in a short interval of length Ot is, like in (A.1), given by:
u(b t p,0;e)
(1 - e""o~) (B.1)
P
The probability ofreceiving ajob offer in a short interval with length Ot is e-oo~ f o(Ot).
A job offer conaista of two characteriatics i.e. wagee and houra which arrive randomly
from a joint wage-hours offer diatribution. The value of a job with hourly wage rate w
and weekly working hours h is denoted by W(w, h; e) for an individual with unobserved
characteristica e. The value of a job will be compared with the value of aearch V(e) in
order to make the job acceptance decision. The equivalent of equation (A.2) becomea
V(e) - u(b t p, 0; e)(1 - e-PO`)~p-~ (B.2)
e-oo~{(1 - e-ao'a0t)V(e) f e'ao'aOtEl,s~l max(V(e), W(w, h; e)]} f o(Ot)
After rearraaging terms and taking the limit At -~ 0 we get
pV(F) - u(b f p, 0; e) f aEls,~l max[0, W(w, h; e) - V(e)] (B.3)
The aesumptione 2 and 5 are used to determine the value of the job with wsge rate w
and houra h:
W(w, h; e) -
u(wh -~ p, h; e)
P
(B.4)
Inaerting this expression in (B.3) yielda
pV (e) - u(b -f p, 0; e) f p Elr ~1 max[0, u(roh -~ p, h; E) - pV (e)] (B.5)
A job offer (w,h) ie accepted if the utility value u(wh f p, h; e) exceeds pV (e). In other
worde, there exiata an unique reservation utiltiy level u(e) with
1{(E) - PV(E) (B.Ó)33
All job offers which generate a utility level above u(E) are acceptsble, those below will
be rejected. According to aasumptioa 6, a(wh -F {t, h; E) is increseing in w, and therefore,
for a given level of h, a wage rate ~(h,u(E); E) can be found such that
u({(h, u(E)i E)Á ~ ~tf I{i E) - iL(E) (B.T )
Thie f(h, u(E); E) can be interpreted ss an houn dependent reserntion wage rate. Using
the sssumption thst wsge and hours arrive simultaneouely from a joint wage-houn offer
dietribution f(w, h), equstioa (B.5) can be rewritten such that the reservation utility
equation (3.1) is obtained:
u(E) - u(b f p, 0; E) ~ ~ fm fW (u(wh -}. W h; E) - u(E)]f(w, h)dwdh (B.8)
p o t(~.a(.):.)
C Derivation of (2.35)
Tn this appendiz we show that if the derivatives of the vector of scores with respect
(!' fll!' ÍI!!I!IÍ~ ÍI I;' ~I~;~ÍI!"'I ÍUI~ f Hi~"II I~nHIl1j4 urc ri 1~INr~.fl I~Y ~" i~) fl~`: eHhr.}~}~~Íun o( }he
i!~li~llnp ~lu~~l~lli l nlll~ ~,I~~~!~N yl I lu III! IIlI~~ I~p~;llfl~~l:l ~ I. I I~I ~~~~I~ I I~~ ptll~. ~I~~!fn
kht r~,mplckr ~1r.nMlly lunrklnt~ entNb difHltH~ rKrlKl,lée Nla 11;1.1~ti~lufa~l.
d- 1 for incomplete spells (t ~ M) (C.1)
- 0 for completed epells (t G M) (C.2)
e- 1 if d- 0 aad (w, h) is observed (C.3)
- 0 if d - 0 aad (w, h) is unobserved (C.4)
The deneity function coasiets of the following parts:
1„(n) if d - 1 (C.5)
(1- a)1,,,(n) if d - 0, e- 0 (C.6)
xl~,(n) if d - 0, e- 1 (C.7)
where x - E(e), the probability that the post unemployment job characteristics sre
observed which has beea assumed to be independent of the parameters of interest and
therefore has been neglected before. l„(tt), l~,(~) aad lo,(p) have been defined in (2.12),
(2.21) and (2.19) respectively. To ehow that the density integratea to 1 we look at each
contribution separately.
I~ l~„(p)dt - 1- f~ exp{-B(E)M}9(E, v;)dE - 1 - 1„(n) (C.8)
o eo
~ ~ ~ !e,(q)dwdhdt - (C.9) I11
I~ I~ Im f- B(E) ezp{-B(E)t}r(hlw, E)T(~É~ g( E, ?~)dedwdhdt - (C.10)34
lYl~ f ~ f1`18(E)exp{-B(E)t}r(h~w,E)T(~E~g(E,c~)dwdedhdt - (C.11)
1 - l„(q) (C.12)
From these reeulte it csn be dezived that
!„(n) f(1- x) f~ l~,(n)dt t x fy f~ f~!m(rl)dwdhdt - 1 (c.13)
o u u o
As a consequence
81~)}(1 - x) r~ 81~t1)~ } x r~ fm rm
81~p)dwdhdt - 0 (C.14)
Jo Jo o jo
or, equivalently,
at„(n) ~ al~,~)~ ~~e [!M 1~ tó~n(n)dwdhdt~ -
o C.15 ~ f(1-~) f ( )
88
~~ W 81e,(sl) 8 ~fó !ó Jó l~,(n)dwdhdt~
f f f 8 dwdhdt - 8 (C.16)
o n
Now note that the left hand aide of (C.16) ie equal to the expectation of e81n l~,(rl)~8r1,
the ecore contribution which we want to eimulate. The derivatives of (C.16) coneiet of
two major terme, i.e. the derivativee with reepect to the bounde and the derivatives with
respect to the integrand. As the derivatives with reepect to the integrand of the right
hand eide are equal to the derivativea with respect to the bounde on the left hand side,
it followe that the derivativee with reepect to the bounde are equal on both sidee as well.
Using the right hand eide of (C.16) and the fact that (C.9) equals (C.11) the derivativee
with reepect to the bounds can be written ae
- f ~B~~E)(1-exP{-6( E)M}J~(É(E))g(Efdi)dE
(c.17)
E
which is expreseion (2.35). To handle the problem with the impliptly defined bounde,
the original derivatives are replaced by their expectation.35
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